The Power Allocation Game on Dynamic Networks: Subgame Perfection by Li, Yuke & Morse, A. Stephen
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
00
90
8v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
1 S
ep
 20
18
The Power Allocation Game on Dynamic Networks: Subgame Perfection
Yuke Li, and A. Stephen Morse
Abstract—In the game theory literature, there appears to
be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form
games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility
functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not
applicable to games involving both cooperative and noncoop-
erative scenarios (e.g., “games on signed graphs”). With the
purpose of equilibrium selection, the power allocation game
developed in [1], which is a static, resource allocation game on
signed graphs, will be reformulated into an extensive form.
Results about the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the
extensive-form game will be given. This appears to be the first
time that subgame perfection based on time-varying graphs is
used for equilibrium selection in network games. This idea of
subgame perfection proposed in the paper may be extrapolated
to other network games, which will be illustrated with a simple
example of congestion games.
Index Terms—subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, equilib-
rium selection, time-varying graph, extensive form, network
games, games on signed graphs
I. INTRODUCTION
In [1], a power allocation game (“PAG”) is developed as a
static, distributed resource allocation game on a network of
countries (equivalently, agents or decision makers of those
countries) connected to each other as friends or adversaries.
Pure strategy Nash equilibrium classes are defined for the
purpose of making game predictions. For instance, a country
may survive in one equilibrium class but not in another [2].
An important question that has apparently not been ad-
dressed is equilibrium selection, e.g., whether there are jus-
tifiable grounds for the agents to play a certain equilibrium or
equilibrium class exclusively. For instance, can they always
play the kinds of equilibria in which a certain country
survives? Technically speaking, this is an equilibrium se-
lection problem for an N -player normal form game with an
infinite strategy space. The literature of equilibrium selection
methods for finite games (e.g., [3]–[7]) is thus irrelevant to
the purpose of this paper.
One noteworthy paper on equilibrium selection for infinite
normal form games is [8]. This work aims to generalize ap-
proaches such as Selten’s trembling hand perfection criterion
originally developed for selecting equilibria in finite games
to the case of infinite normal form games with continuous
utility functions. However, the methods in [8] cannot be
applied to the PAG because by the two preference axioms
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in [2], the real-valued utility function representation of
countries’ preference for the power allocation matrices must
be discontinuous [9]. The more recent work in [10]–[12]
contains the development of equilibrium selection methods
for infinite normal-form games with discontinuous utility
functions. But the assumptions for the utility functions in
those discontinuous games to hold include, for instance,
“payoff-security”, and are therefore inapplicable, either.
Some other existing criteria for equilibrium selection can
be shown to be unsuitable for equilibrium selection in the
PAG for more substantive reasons. Based on these criteria,
the equilibria may be required to be also “Pareto optimal”,
“coalition-proof”, and so forth, thereby refining the Nash
equilibria set. However, the definition of Pareto optimality
states that no agent can be better off without making at
least another agent worse off. This concept does not seem
appropriate for conflictual scenarios where players adopt a
certain “winner-takes-all” logic. In addition, by the concept
of coalition-proof Nash equilibria, any subset of players in
the game cannot all strictly benefit with any form of joint
deviations. But in the context of the PAG, the idea of joint
deviations by a “coalition” consisting of some countries and
their adversaries may be farfetched.
In this paper we apply the notion of time-varying graphs
to the PAG, i.e., to have the PAG take place in a sequence of
changing networked environments, and explore the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria in the extensive-form PAG. The first
investigations of extensive form games include [13], [14]
and [15]; one classic application is the Stackelberg game
for the study of market competition, where a leader acts first
before the followers choose to whether to enter the market to
compete with it. In the context of the PAG, in an “ascending
chain” sequence, the environment may gradually “expand”
to incorporate more adversary and friend relations among
countries over time. In a “descending chain” sequence, the
environment may undergo “faults” over time in the sense
that some relations may disappear. In any of the sequences,
countries optimize by sequentially allocating their power to a
queue of friends and adversaries. A single decision maker’s
optimization will be done much like in other resource alloca-
tion problems such as packing. However, a major difference
from these other problems is that in a resource allocation
game, it will be of more interest to explore multiple decision
makers’ allocation strategies which are in best responses with
one another. The idea of subgame perfection based on time-
varying graphs has seldom been used in equilibrium selection
for network games. It seems that this idea may also be
applicable to other network games, such as congestion games
(to which subgame perfection based on agents’ sequential
moves like in the Stackelberg game has been applied, e.g.,
[16]).
This paper is organized as follows. First the power allo-
cation game formulated in [1] will be briefly summarized
in Section II. Then in Section III the extensive- form PAG
will be described and finally in Section IV results pertaining
to the new game form will be stated. In Section V a
simple example of how the method can be applicable to
congestion games will be illustrated. Lastly, modifications
to the presented idea appropriate to different contexts will
be discussed.
II. REVIEW: THE PAG IN NORMAL FORM
A. Basic Idea
By the power allocation game or PAG is meant a dis-
tributed resource allocation game between n countries with
labels in n = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The game is formulated on a
simple, undirected, signed graph G called “an environment
graph” [2] whose n vertices correspond to the countries and
whose m edges represent relationships between countries.
An edge between distinct vertices i and j, denoted by (i, j),
is labeled with a plus sign if countries i an j are friends and
with a minus sign if countries i and j are adversaries. Let the
set of all friendly pairs be RF and the set of all adversarial
pairs be RA. For each i ∈ n, Fi and Ai denote the sets of
labels of country i’s friends and adversaries respectively; it
is assumed that i ∈ Fi and that Fi and Ai are disjoint sets.
Each country i possesses a nonnegative quantity pi called
the total power of country i. An allocation of this power
or strategy is a nonnegative n × 1 row vector ui whose j
component uij is that part of pi which country i allocates
under the strategy to either support country j if j ∈ Fi
or to demise country j if j ∈ Ai; accordingly uij = 0 if
j 6∈ Fi ∪ Ai and ui1 + ui2 + · · · + uin = pi. The goal
of the game is for each country to choose a strategy which
contributes to the demise of all of its adversaries and to the
support of all of its friends.
Each set of country strategies {ui, i ∈ n} determines an
n× n matrix U whose ith row is ui. Thus U = [uij ]n×n is
a nonnegative matrix such that, for each i ∈ n, ui1 + ui2 +
· · ·+ uin = pi. Any such matrix is called a strategy matrix
and U is the set of all n× n strategy matrices.
B. Multi-front Pursuit of Survival
In [1] and [2], how countries allocate the power in the
support of the survival of its friends and the demise of
that of its adversaries is studied, which is in line with
the fundamental assumptions about countries’ behavior in
classical international relations theory. [17] The following
additional formulations are offered:
Each strategy matrix U determines for each i ∈ n, the
total support σi(U) of country i and the total threat τi(U)
against country i. Here σi : U → IR and τi : U → IR are
non-negative valued maps defined by U 7−→
∑
j∈Fi
uji +∑
j∈Ai
uij and U 7−→
∑
j∈Ai
uji respectively. Thus country
i’s total support is the sum of the amounts of power each of
country i’s friends allocate to its support plus the sum of the
amounts of power country i allocates to the destruction of all
of its adversaries. Country i’s total threat, on the other hand,
is the sum of the amounts of power country i’s adversaries
allocate to its destruction. These allocations in turn determine
country i’s state xi(U) which may be safe, precarious, or
unsafe depending on the relative values of σi(U) and τi(U).
In particular, xi(U) = safe if σi(U) > τi(U), xi(U) =
precarious if σi(U) = τi(U), or xi(U) = unsafe if σi(U) <
τi(U).
In playing the PAG, countries select individual strategies
in accordance with certain weak and/or strong preferences.
A sufficient set of conditions for country i to weakly prefer
strategy matrix V ∈ U over strategy matrix U ∈ U are as
follows
1) For all j ∈ Fi either xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}, or
xj(U) ∈ {unsafe}, or both.
2) For all j ∈ Ai either xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious},
or xj(U) ∈ {safe}, or both.
Weak preference by country i of V over U is denoted by
U  V .
Meanwhile, a sufficient condition for country i to be
indifferent to the choice between V and U is that xi(U) =
xj(V ) for all j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai. This is denoted by V ∼ U .
Finally, a sufficient condition for country i to strongly
prefer V over U is that xi(V ) be a safe or precarious state
and xi(U) be an unsafe state. Strong preference by country
i of V over U is denoted by U ≺ V .
III. THE PAG IN EXTENSIVE FORM
A. Sequence of Spanning Subgraphs
Let G = (V , E) be called an “environment graph” as in
[2]. Write G for the set of all spanning subgraphs of G. Let
a sequence of spanning subgraphs G(t), t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}
from G be such that G(t) ∈ G, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. Let
Fi(t) and Ai(t) respectively be the sets of labels of country
i’s friends and adversaries at time t.
A sequence of spanning subgraphs G(t), t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , n} from G is an ascending chain if G(t) ⊂
G(t+1), t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} where by G(t) ⊂ G(t+1) we
mean that the edge set of G(t) is contained in the edge set
of G(t+ 1). Conversely, a sequence of spanning subgraphs
G(t), t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} from G is a descending chain if
G(t+ 1) ⊂ G(t), t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Remark 1: Let the ascending sequence G(t), t ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , n} reach G from G(0) in n steps, i.e., G(n) =
G. For such as an ascending chain of spanning subgraphs that
reaches the environment subgraph G at time t, the number
of subgraphs at time t has to satisfy,
m−α∑
β=0
(m− α)!
β!
where m is the total number of edges in G, α is the number
of edges in G(t− 1) and β is the number of edges in G(t).
B. Sequence of Decisions
At time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, every country i decides on its
strategy ui(t), i.e., the amount of resources being allocated to
its friends and adversaries labeled respectively in Fi(t) and
Ai(t), subject to its total power constraint i ∈ n, ui1(t) +
ui2(t) + · · · + uin(t) = pi. Various decision rules may be
assumed, which will be discussed in Section IV. For time
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let the set of power allocation matrices at
layer t be represented as U(t) ⊂ Rn×n where ∀U(t) ∈ U(t)
and i ∈ n.
The information structure of the dynamic game is com-
plete information. When making each possible allocation at
time t, each country has observed the power allocation path
prior to time t, which is
U(0), U(1), . . . , U(t− 1).
At the end of the sequence, each country i receives its state
xi(U(t), t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}) as the outcome of the power
allocation path from t = 0 to t = n,
U(0), U(1), . . . , U(n).
In other words, as consistent with a standard extensive-form
game, the power allocation outcome is only realized at t = n.
C. Sequence of Subgames
The power allocation game in extensive form can be rep-
resented by a decision tree T with n layers and a nonempty
set of decision nodes at layer t where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.
As opposed to other extensive form games (e.g., two-player
games), at each decision point, all countries will decide on
their allocations on the corresponding subgraph, ending up
playing a “smaller” version of the original normal form PAG.
The root node denotes the decision point of the countries
involved in environment graph at t = 0, G(0). Each decision
node at each layer denotes the point the countries have
to decide on the allocations on the friend and adversary
relations involved in the environment graph G(t). From each
node at layer t, there grows an infinite number of branches,
the qth of which represents a possible allocation strategy
Uq(t) made by countries to those friends and adversaries.
The number of the branches between any node at layer t
and its successors at layer t+ 1 is the cardinality of U(t).
In addition, each decision node in the tree T represents
an information set. As is commonly defined, an information
set is a set of decision nodes that establishes all the possible
allocations that could have taken place in the game so far,
given what the players that will act next have observed.
Assuming complete and perfect information (i.e., the power
allocation path leading to the particular decision node has
already been observed by countries), each information set in
the tree is a singleton.
Such a decision tree defines a sequence of subgames.
In this extensive form game framework, the q-th (q ∈ N)
decision node at layer t of T (t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}) and all
its successors make up a subgame at layer t; let the set of
subgames at layer t be κ(t). Obviously, the total number of
U1(0) Un(0)
U1(1) Un-1(1) Un(1)
t = 0
allocations on G(0)
t = 1 t =1 allocations on G(1)
t = 2 t = 2 t = 2 t =2
allocations on G(2)
Fig. 1: An example of a decision tree T up to t = 2
decision nodes in T equals the total number of subgames.
Each path in the tree T represents a power allocation path
from t = 0 to t = n, U(0), U(1), . . . , U(n). A function η :
U(0)× U(1) . . .× U(n) −→ κ(0)× κ(1) . . .× κ(n)
maps a power allocation path to a sequence of n+1 subgames
it has traversed, where the t-th subgame of this sequence can
be represented as η(U(0), U(1), U(n))t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}.
As consistent with the assumptions in the normal form, there
is only a finite number of possible power allocation outcomes
realized at the terminal nodes of the tree, i.e., a number of
3n possible state vectors which countries will partially order
based on the axioms in the setup of the PAG.
D. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In an extensive-form game, it is natural to investigate
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In extensive form
games with finite strategy space, a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium should in principle include the complete plan of
every agent’s action in every instance they would encounter;
however, it is impossible to do the same for the PAG, which
motivates the below definition based on equilibrium paths of
power allocation strategy matrices.
Definition 1 (Subgame Perfection Nash Equilibrium): A
power allocation path
U∗(0), . . . U∗(t) . . . U∗(n)
on a sequence of the spanning subgraphs of the environment
graph G is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the PAG
Γ in extensive form if and only if it is an equilibrium in all
of the n+ 1 subgames it traverses.
E. Extension with Incomplete Information
Though not the focus of this paper, a straightforward
extension can be made to incorporate incomplete infor-
mation into the extensive-form PAG. Suppose there exists
an additional agent called the nature. The nature draws a
probability distribution over the space of the sequences. Let
a probability distribution over the measurable space Ω of all
possible sequences of the spanning subgraphs of G be δ,
and where the h-th sequence takes the probability mass δh.
On each possible sequence, countries play the corresponding
extensive-form game as formulated previously.
Remark 2: Denote a subgame perfect equilibrium
of a PAG assuming a possible sequence h as
(U(0), U(1), . . . , U(n))h. Assuming all countries have
a “common prior” about the probability distribution δ over
Ω, (U(0), U(1), . . . , U(n))h is always a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (see relevant definitions in [18]).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
When analyzing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
extensive-form PAG, it is necessary to assume a specific
decision rule for the game. Two specific examples are below,
where the second can be regarded as a special case of the
first.
Decision Rule 1: At time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, every country
i collects its allocations to its friends and adversaries labeled
in Fi(t−1) and Ai(t−1) back into its reserved power uii(t),
and decides how to reallocate uii(t), which is equal to pi,
to its friends and adversaries labeled in Fi(t) and Ai(t).
Decision Rule 1.1: At time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, every
country i keeps constant its allocations to its friends and
adversaries labeled in Fi(t − 1) and Ai(t − 1) that have
not disappeared at t, collects allocations to those that have
disappeared at t back into uii(t), and allocates its reserved
power uii(t) to its new friends and adversaries labeled in
Fi(t)−Fi(t− 1) and Ai(t)−Ai(t− 1).
Lemma 1: In an extensive-form PAG on a sequence of
spanning subgraphs of G, the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium set by assuming Decision rule 1 is the superset of
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium set by assuming Decision
rule 2.
Proof: Trivial by the definition of Decision Rule 1.1.
Under Decision Rule 1, when reallocating, let every country
allocate the same amount of power as it does at t− 1 to its
friends and adversaries that still remain at t, and the rest of
the power to new friends and adversaries labeled in Fi(t)−
Fi(t− 1) and Ai(t)−Ai(t− 1).
Therefore, any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
U∗(0), U∗(1), . . . , U∗(n) by assuming Decision rule 1.1
must also be an equilibrium path by assuming Decision rule
1.
Theorem 1: Given a pure strategy Nash equilibrium U∗
of the normal-form PAG on G, if in U∗ there exists two
countries i and j who have made zero allocations to each
other u∗ij = u
∗
ji = 0, U
∗ can be realized on the equilibrium
path of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an extensive-
form PAG on a sequence of spanning graphs of G. This holds
independently of the decision rule assumed.
Proof: Let an ascending chain of two environment
graphs G(0), G(1) be such that G(1) = G, and G(0) ⊂ G1
in the sense that E1 − E0 = (i, j).
Proceeding backwardly, a power allocation path
U(0), U(1) is mapped to a sequence of two subgames
κ0 and κ1. κ0 is the subgame where U1 is chosen, and κ1
is the subgame where the path U(0), U(1) is chosen, which
can be regarded as the extensive-form game itself.
Let U(1) = U(0) = U∗. At t = 1, U1 is by definition
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in κ0. At t = 0, none of
the agents would like to deviate from the strategies in U(0).
Therefore, the path U(0), U(1) is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 2: Given any sequence of spanning subgraphs
of the environment graph of the normal-form PAG G, a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can always be found in the
extensive-form PAG on that sequence by assuming Decision
Rule 1.
Proof: By Decision Rule 1, at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},
suppose countries are playing the normal-form PAG onG(n).
Since it has been shown that any normal-form PAG has a
pure straetgy Nash equiilbrium, let U∗(n) be a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of this game.
U∗(0), U∗(1), . . . , U∗(n) is an optimal path for the coun-
tries in the extensive game and obviously a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3: Given a particular subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, the possible sequences of spanning subgraphs on
which this equilibrium is realized in the corresponding
extensive-form game always exists (by definition) but may
not be unique. For example, in Lemma 1, there exists an
opposite, descending chain of the spanning subgraphs G(1),
G(0) where U(1), U(0) = U∗ is the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 3: A balanced equilibrium U∗ of the normal-
form PAG on G as defined in [19] can be realized on the
equilibrium path of a subgame prefect Nash equilibrium in
an extensive-form PAG on a sequence of spanning subgraphs
of G by assuming Decision Rule 1.
Proof: A power allocation matrix U of a PAG is a
balanced equilibrium if
1) ∀i ∈ n such that Ai is the empty set, uii = pi.
2) ∀i ∈ n such that Ai is nonempty, uii = 0 and
∑
j∈Ai
uij = pi
3) ∀(i, j) ∈ RA, uij = uji.
Case I: RA 6= ∅. Take an adversary pair (i, j) ∈ RA.
Let an ascending chain of spanning subgraphs of G, G(0),
G(1) be such that G(1) = G, G(0) ⊂ G(1) in the sense that
E1 − E0 = (i, j).
Assuming Decision Rule 1, let U(1) = U∗ where U∗ is a
balanced equilibrium. Let U(0) be only different from U(1)
in that the allocations uij(0) = uji(0) = 0, and uii(0) =
ujj(0) = uij(1) = uji(1).
A power allocation path U(0), U(1) is thus mapped to a
sequence of two subgames κ0 and κ1. κ0 is the subgame
where U1 is chosen, and κ1 is the subgame where the path
U(0), U(1) is chosen.
v1
v2v3
v4
v5
v6
v7v8
v9
v10
(a) G(0)
v1
v2v3
v4
v5
v6
v7v8
v9
v10
(b) G(1)
Fig. 2: An ascending chain of spanning subgraphs
U0 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of κ0. U(0), U(1)
constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the exten-
sive form game asssuming the above graph sequence.
Case II:RA = ∅. There always exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the normal-form PAG where two countries i
and j such that u∗ij = u
∗
ji = 0.
By Theorem 1, U∗ can always be realized on the equi-
librium path of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an
extensive form of the PAG.
Example 1: Let the environment graph of the normal-form
PAG G is a Petersen graph. Assume that each of the ten
countries has two adversaries and two friends (itself and
one external) as shown in Fig. 2(b). Assume in addition the
ascending chain of spanning subgraphs G(0),G(1), where
G(0) contains two separate cycles of adversary relations and
G(1) = G. As illustrated in the allocation graphs in Fig. 3
whose definition is in [2], U(1) is a balanced equilibrium and
the power allocationpath U(0), U(1) is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4: The constructive algorithm in [1] derives a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an extensive-form PAG
on a sequence of spanning subgraphs of G by assuming
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Fig. 3: Allocations on the ascending chain
Decision Rule 1.1.
Proof: First, let q ∈ N be the number of adversarial
pairs in RA, and m = {1, 2, . . . , q} be the set of labels.
Let γ : RA 7→ m. At time t, r−1(t) = {i, j} is the t-
th adversary pair being traversed by the algorithm. Let the
remaining power of countries i and j involved in this relation
be zi(t) and zj(t), t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}.
Given the environment graph of the PAG G, the algo-
rithm in [1] proceeds with traversing each adversary relation
and constructing allocations on the relation consecutively.
This actually gives rise to an ascending chain of environ-
ment graphs that reaches the G at the last step, E(0) =
RF , E(1) = RF ∪ r−1(1), . . . , E(q + 1) = RF ∪ r−1(1) ∪
r−1(2) ∪ . . . ... ∪ r−1(q). This algorithm is consistent with
Decision Rule 1.1.
Let a sequence of power allocation matrices
U(0), U(1), . . . , U(q) represent the sequence of
allocations constructed by the algorithm where
U(0) = diagonal{z1(0), z2(0), . . . , zn(0)} =
diagonal{p1, p2, . . . , pn}, and U(t + 1) =
diagonal{z1(t), z2(t), zi(t) − min{zi(t), zj(t)}, . . . , zj(t) −
min{zi(t), zj(t)}, zn(t)} +
∑
r−1(t)∈RA,t∈q
(eTi ej +
eTj ei)min{zi(t), zj(t)}, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q}.
A sequence of q + 1 subgames is derived. Proceeding
backwardly, κt is the subgame where the path U(q − t +
1), U(q − t+ 2), . . . , U(q) is chosen, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q + 1}.
In this extensive form game, no country i will want to
deviate from its strategy ui(t), t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Therefore,
the sequence of allocations represent a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Corollary 1: Given a normal-form PAG on G, if for i ∈
n, its power is no larger than the total power of its two
adversaries pi ≤
∑
j∈Ai
pj , there always exists a subgame
perfect Nash euilibrium in an extensive-form PAG on a
sequence of spanning subgraphs of G that predicts i to be
precarious at the last step n of the power allocation path,
that is, σi(U(n)) = τi(U(n)), by assuming Decision Rule
1.1.
Proof: Let q ∈ N be the number of adversarial pairs
in RA, and m = {1, 2, . . . , q} be the set of labels. Suppose
i has g adversaries (g ≤ q, and g ∈ N). Without loss of
generality, assume that the set of labels for these adversaries
is m′ = {1, 2, . . . , g} ⊂m. As in Theorem 3, let γ : RA 7→
m, and assume the same algorithm in [1].
From t = 0 to t = g, the algorithm proceeds with each
adversary relation of i and constructing allocations on the
relation consecutively. From t = g+1 to t = q, the algorithm
will traverse the rest of the adversarial pairs.
A sequence of power allocation matrices
U(0), U(1), . . . , U(q) constructed by the algorithm
is U(0) = diagonal{z1(0), z2(0), . . . , zn(0)} =
diagonal{p1, p2, . . . , pn}, and U(t + 1) =
diagonal{z1(t), z2(t), zi(t) − min{zi(t), zj(t)}, . . . , zj(t) −
min{zi(t), zj(t)}, zn(t)} +
∑
r−1(t)∈RA,t∈q
(eTi ej +
eTj ei)min{zi(t), zj(t)}, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q}.
This gives rise to an ascending chain of environment
graphs that reaches the G at the last step, E(0) =
RF , E(1) = RF ∪ r−1(1), . . . , E(g) = RF ∪ r−1(1) ∪
r−1(2) ∪ . . . ... ∪ r−1(g), . . . , E(q + 1) = RF ∪ r−1(1) ∪
r−1(2) ∪ . . . ... ∪ r−1(q).
For t ∈ {m,m + 1, . . . , q}, zi(m) = 0. By Theorem 3,
U(0), U(1), . . . , U(n) is a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. Therefore, for t ∈ {m,m + 1, . . . , q}, σi(U(t)) =
τi(U(t)).
Theorem 5: Given a normal-form PAG on a complete
graph of only adversary relations, if countries’ power condi-
tion satisfies pi ≤
∑
j∈Ai
pj , a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium in which only a country is safe, that is, σi(U(n)) >
τi(U(n)) at the last step n of the power allocation path,
can be guaranteed through a class of sequences of spanning
subgraphs assuming Decision Rule 1.1.
Proof: Given an arbitrary country i in n, the set of
adversarial pairs except for those involving i is denoted as
RA − {{i, j} : j ∈ Ai}. Note that RA − {{i, j} : j ∈ Ai}
still make up a complete subgraph of G, G′ = {n−{i}, E ′}.
Let an ascending sequence of two spanning subgraphs of
G be such that G(0) = G′ and G(1) = G.
1) If there exists a country j in the subgraph G(0), that is,
j ∈ n−{i}, such that its power is no smaller than that
of all other countries (i.e., its adversaries) combined in
the subgraph,
pj >
∑
k∈Aj−{i}
pk.
First, on G(0), let country j allocate enough to make
all of its adversaries other than i unsafe. Construct an
U(0) = [ujk(0)](n−1)×(n−1) where there holds
∀k ∈ Aj − {i}, ujk(0) > pk
and ∑
h∈Ak−{i}
ukh(0) = pk
Then on G(0), assuming Decision Rule 1.1, let country
i allocate enough to make j unsafe. Construct an
U(1) = [uij ]n×n by expanding U(0) to incorporate
the allocations between i and countries in n−{i}. Let
uij(1) > pj −
∑
k∈Aj−{i}
ujk(0).
This is feasible because, as assumed, pi <
∑
j∈Ai
.
Then
pj − pi ≤
∑
k∈Aj−{i}
pk ≤
∑
k∈Aj−{i}
ujk(0)
Rearranging terms,
pi ≥ pj −
∑
k∈Aj−{i}
ujk(0).
None of the countries would like to deviate from
its strategies in U(0), U(1). Therefore, a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium has been derived such that
σi(U(1)) > τi(U(1)) and σj(U(1)) < τj(U(1)) for
all j ∈ n− {i}.
2) If there does not exist a country in G(0) such that its
power exceeds all other countries in the subgraph. By
[19], a balancing equilibrium U ′ exists for the PAG of
the n− 1 countries on G′.
Let it be U(0) = [ujk(0)](n−1)×(n−1), where by
definition
∀j ∈ n′, ujj(0) = 0; ∀j, k ∈ n
′, ujk(0) = ujk(0);
∑
k∈Aj−{i}
ujk(0) = pj.
In this case, as consistent with Decision Rule 1.1,
expand U(0) to incorporate the allocations between i
and countries in n−{i} to obtain U(1). ∀j ∈ n−{i},
let uij(0) =
pi
n−1 .
None of the countries would like to deviate from its
strategies in U(0), U(1). Then a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium has been derived such that σi0(U(1)) >
τi0(U(1)) and σj(U(1)) < τj(U(1)) for all j ∈ n −
{i}.
Remark 4: An important implication from Corollary 1 and
Theorem 5 is that the particular state i can possibly be in a
PAG becomes controllable if the some particular conditions
hold, thus fulfilling the purpose of equilibrium selection.
The control is specifically done by a sequence of spanning
subgraphs of the environment graph as well as a suitably
defined decision rule.
V. EXAMPLE: APPLICATION TO OTHER NETWORK
GAMES
Consider a two-step ascending chain of a road network
where at t = 0 only road A is opened up and only at t = 1
road B is added. Let each agent’s action space be (A,B).
Similarly, a descending chain where at t = 0 the two roads
A and B both exist and at t = 1 one road, A, gets closed
down and thus disappears from the network.
Assume the following decision rule: at each step, each
agent chooses whether to take the road in the subgraph. Once
an agent has chosen a road, it cannot take any more roads
later. At t = 1, the payoffs as shown in the above table are
realized.
In the ascending chain case, the only subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of this extensive form game is (A,B)
because agent 1 will make sure to take road A at t = 0 and
agent 2 takes road B at t = 1. Neither will have incentives
to deviate. However, when the opposite holds, i.e., when at
t = 0 only road B is opened up and only at t = 1 road A
is added, (B,A) will instead be the only subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has focused specifically on selecting (or refin-
ing) the pure strategy Nash equilibria set of the normal-form
PAG based on the extensive-form game. Two assumptions
are invoked in the formulation of this problem. First, a state
vector is realized only at the end of a power allocation path
as the power allocation outcome. Second, the graph at each
time step is a spanning subgraph of the environment graph
in the normal-form PAG.
The ideas in the paper can be adapted to the studies
of other problems of interest. For this to happen, the two
assumptions should be relaxed. In terms of a differential
game problem where countries would optimally control
their power allocation paths in changing environments, the
problem formulation should have a state or payoff vector
realized at the end of every period on the allocation path.
Countries’ power and relations may also change over time,
either deterministically or stochastically. Moreover, the en-
vironment graph at each time instant may be any possible
signed graph of those countries. In terms of equilibrium
selection in network formation games, it should be noted that
agents’ strategies are to form or change the network itself in
these games. Accordingly instead of assuming environment
graphs that change over time, the kinds of agents that are
able to choose their strategies should be assumed to change
instead. For instance, at each time step, a subset of agents
is only allowed to choose their strategies of whether to
connect with others, where a simple leader-follower sequence
as mentioned before will be a special case.
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